
A global Microsoft outage disrupted Outlook, Teams, and other Microsoft 365 services for more than 24 hours. Downdetector logged more than 7.4 million outage reports worldwide, although these were reports rather than 7.4 million individual users. Microsoft ultimately attributed the disruption to a technical infrastructure issue and said it was not related to malicious cyber activity or AI.1,2
For organisations that rely heavily on email, calendars, collaboration tools, and cloud services, it became something of a Black Friday for business productivity.
The interesting question is not whether Microsoft, or any other major provider, should never experience an outage. No technology platform can reasonably be expected never to fail.
The more useful question is: How well can an organisation continue delivering important services when a critical supplier does fail?
It is too early to state a reliable total cost for the outage.
The productivity impact of a major technology disruption is not limited to the hours when a system is unavailable. It can include:
The New Zealand experience illustrated the range of possible outcomes. Courts, property settlements, vehicle-related registrations, supermarkets, health services and government agencies reported impacts. Immigration New Zealand paused visa processing, while hospitals used alternatives such as phones, fax machines, and physical forms. Importantly, Health New Zealand described the disruption to its services as minimal at that stage and reported no impact on patient safety.3,4
Operational resilience is not simply about whether a system goes down. It is about whether the organisation can deliver continuity of services and products while a key system is down.
Australian financial institutions are now operating under the current version of APRA’s CPS 230 Operational Risk Management standard.
CPS 230 applies across APRA regulated banks, general insurers, life insurers, private health insurers, and registrable superannuation entity licensees. The current standard commenced on 1 July 2026.5
It requires regulated entities to:
That is a useful lens to consider the Microsoft outage through.
The question is no longer simply: “When will Microsoft restore the service?”
It becomes: “Which of our critical operations depend on Microsoft, how long can they tolerate disruption, what customer impacts arise, and what can we continue delivering while the service is unavailable?”
This is not solely an IT question.
It cuts across technology, people, operations, business continuity, third-party risk, customer outcomes, communications, incident management, and executive decision-making.
Reuters reported that Aviva had tested a similar-scale outage of its most critical technology systems about two weeks before the Microsoft incident. During the real outage, it used contingency arrangements including alternative telephone numbers and Bluetooth to transfer recordings while email was unavailable.7
That is a practical illustration of the difference between having a continuity plan on paper and having arrangements that people have tested and can actually use.
New Zealand’s operational-resilience environment is also maturing, although through several regulatory channels.
Under the CoFI licensing regime, in addition to maintaining effective fair conduct programmes, licensed financial institutions are subject to standard conditions covering outsourcing, business continuity, and technology systems.
Condition 4 requires a financial institution that outsources a necessary system or process to be satisfied that the provider can perform to the standard required for the institution to meet its licence obligations.
Condition 5 requires:
This is directly relevant to fair customer outcomes.
With recent changes bringing consumer credit supervision under the remit of the FMCA market licencing regime, consumer credit lenders who weren’t subject to these standard licence conditions previously, will soon be.
A technology outage is not automatically a conduct breach. However, where an outage prevents customers from making payments, contacting their provider, progressing a claim or obtaining important information, operational resilience and fair treatment become closely connected.
Customers experience resilience through firms when they can still access essential services, receive accurate information and obtain appropriate support during disruption.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is developing a more explicit prudential framework for operational resilience under the Deposit Takers Act 2023.
In 2026, the Reserve Bank consulted on a draft Operational Resilience Standard, a related draft Outsourcing Standard, and a proposed Critical Operations and Material Service Providers Register.9
The draft Operational Resilience Standard would require deposit takers to identify critical operations, establish tolerance levels, maintain a register of critical operations and material service providers, manage ICT and service-provider risks, and maintain business-continuity arrangements.10
The draft is not yet final and remains subject to change. Expect to see similar requirements applied to Insurers under the proposed changes to the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010.
This gives New Zealand deposit takers an opportunity to think beyond traditional disaster recovery.
Key questions include:
The Microsoft outage provides a useful real-world scenario against which to test those questions.
There can be a tendency to view operational resilience primarily as a regulatory compliance exercise.
That misses much of its practical value.
Effective resilience arrangements are intended to:
Regulation cannot prevent the next Microsoft, cloud, telecommunications, or cyber incident.
But it can require institutions to understand their dependencies, establish tolerances, test credible scenarios, and prepare workable alternatives.
The objective is not to promise that nothing will fail.
It is to ensure that when something does fail, the organisation can continue delivering the services its customers genuinely need.
The Microsoft outage was an inconvenient and costly disruption for businesses and customers around the world. It was also a very public operational-resilience test.
For Australian regulated institutions operating under CPS 230, it provides an opportunity to assess whether critical operations genuinely remained within tolerance during a prolonged third-party technology disruption.
For New Zealand financial institutions, the direction is increasingly clear. CoFI and other market service licence conditions already connect outsourcing, continuity, technology resilience, and fair treatment. The Deposit Takers Act will introduce a more explicit prudential operational-resilience framework, although the current standard remains in draft. IPSA reform may enable a broader range of insurer standards, with detailed content not yet to be decided but likely including more prescriptive operational resilience standards.
The goal should not simply be regulatory compliance.
It should be ensuring that when the next major disruption occurs, customers can still access essential services, and financial institutions can continue operating effectively.
That is a win for customers, regulators, and financial institutions.
Mosaic has a range of experts who have experience in practically applying operational resilience, CPS 230 or the developing New Zealand regulatory environment. If this is something that is top of mind, I would love to chat. Feel free to reach out.
Sources:

A global Microsoft outage disrupted Outlook, Teams, and other Microsoft 365 services for more than 24 hours. Downdetector logged more than 7.4 million outage reports worldwide, although these were reports rather than 7.4 million individual users. Microsoft ultimately attributed the disruption to a technical infrastructure issue and said it was not related to malicious cyber activity or AI.1,2
For organisations that rely heavily on email, calendars, collaboration tools, and cloud services, it became something of a Black Friday for business productivity.
The interesting question is not whether Microsoft, or any other major provider, should never experience an outage. No technology platform can reasonably be expected never to fail.
The more useful question is: How well can an organisation continue delivering important services when a critical supplier does fail?
It is too early to state a reliable total cost for the outage.
The productivity impact of a major technology disruption is not limited to the hours when a system is unavailable. It can include:
The New Zealand experience illustrated the range of possible outcomes. Courts, property settlements, vehicle-related registrations, supermarkets, health services and government agencies reported impacts. Immigration New Zealand paused visa processing, while hospitals used alternatives such as phones, fax machines, and physical forms. Importantly, Health New Zealand described the disruption to its services as minimal at that stage and reported no impact on patient safety.3,4
Operational resilience is not simply about whether a system goes down. It is about whether the organisation can deliver continuity of services and products while a key system is down.
Australian financial institutions are now operating under the current version of APRA’s CPS 230 Operational Risk Management standard.
CPS 230 applies across APRA regulated banks, general insurers, life insurers, private health insurers, and registrable superannuation entity licensees. The current standard commenced on 1 July 2026.5
It requires regulated entities to:
That is a useful lens to consider the Microsoft outage through.
The question is no longer simply: “When will Microsoft restore the service?”
It becomes: “Which of our critical operations depend on Microsoft, how long can they tolerate disruption, what customer impacts arise, and what can we continue delivering while the service is unavailable?”
This is not solely an IT question.
It cuts across technology, people, operations, business continuity, third-party risk, customer outcomes, communications, incident management, and executive decision-making.
Reuters reported that Aviva had tested a similar-scale outage of its most critical technology systems about two weeks before the Microsoft incident. During the real outage, it used contingency arrangements including alternative telephone numbers and Bluetooth to transfer recordings while email was unavailable.7
That is a practical illustration of the difference between having a continuity plan on paper and having arrangements that people have tested and can actually use.
New Zealand’s operational-resilience environment is also maturing, although through several regulatory channels.
Under the CoFI licensing regime, in addition to maintaining effective fair conduct programmes, licensed financial institutions are subject to standard conditions covering outsourcing, business continuity, and technology systems.
Condition 4 requires a financial institution that outsources a necessary system or process to be satisfied that the provider can perform to the standard required for the institution to meet its licence obligations.
Condition 5 requires:
This is directly relevant to fair customer outcomes.
With recent changes bringing consumer credit supervision under the remit of the FMCA market licencing regime, consumer credit lenders who weren’t subject to these standard licence conditions previously, will soon be.
A technology outage is not automatically a conduct breach. However, where an outage prevents customers from making payments, contacting their provider, progressing a claim or obtaining important information, operational resilience and fair treatment become closely connected.
Customers experience resilience through firms when they can still access essential services, receive accurate information and obtain appropriate support during disruption.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is developing a more explicit prudential framework for operational resilience under the Deposit Takers Act 2023.
In 2026, the Reserve Bank consulted on a draft Operational Resilience Standard, a related draft Outsourcing Standard, and a proposed Critical Operations and Material Service Providers Register.9
The draft Operational Resilience Standard would require deposit takers to identify critical operations, establish tolerance levels, maintain a register of critical operations and material service providers, manage ICT and service-provider risks, and maintain business-continuity arrangements.10
The draft is not yet final and remains subject to change. Expect to see similar requirements applied to Insurers under the proposed changes to the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010.
This gives New Zealand deposit takers an opportunity to think beyond traditional disaster recovery.
Key questions include:
The Microsoft outage provides a useful real-world scenario against which to test those questions.
There can be a tendency to view operational resilience primarily as a regulatory compliance exercise.
That misses much of its practical value.
Effective resilience arrangements are intended to:
Regulation cannot prevent the next Microsoft, cloud, telecommunications, or cyber incident.
But it can require institutions to understand their dependencies, establish tolerances, test credible scenarios, and prepare workable alternatives.
The objective is not to promise that nothing will fail.
It is to ensure that when something does fail, the organisation can continue delivering the services its customers genuinely need.
The Microsoft outage was an inconvenient and costly disruption for businesses and customers around the world. It was also a very public operational-resilience test.
For Australian regulated institutions operating under CPS 230, it provides an opportunity to assess whether critical operations genuinely remained within tolerance during a prolonged third-party technology disruption.
For New Zealand financial institutions, the direction is increasingly clear. CoFI and other market service licence conditions already connect outsourcing, continuity, technology resilience, and fair treatment. The Deposit Takers Act will introduce a more explicit prudential operational-resilience framework, although the current standard remains in draft. IPSA reform may enable a broader range of insurer standards, with detailed content not yet to be decided but likely including more prescriptive operational resilience standards.
The goal should not simply be regulatory compliance.
It should be ensuring that when the next major disruption occurs, customers can still access essential services, and financial institutions can continue operating effectively.
That is a win for customers, regulators, and financial institutions.
Mosaic has a range of experts who have experience in practically applying operational resilience, CPS 230 or the developing New Zealand regulatory environment. If this is something that is top of mind, I would love to chat. Feel free to reach out.
Sources: